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Abstract:
The Tobin tax is an often discussed method to tame speculation and get a
source of income. The discussion is especially heated when the financial mar-
kets are in crisis. In this article we refer to foreign exchange markets. The
Tobin tax should be a small international tax affecting all currency transac-
tions and thus consequently reducing the destabilizing speculations. In this
way this tax should take over a control function. By including Tobin tax in
the microscopic model of Cont and Bouchaud one finds that Tobin tax could
be the right method to control foreign exchange operations and get a good
source of income.
1 Introduction
The reader who is familiar with the economically background of foreign ex-
change markets may skip this section.
1.1 Financial markets in particular the foreign exchange
markets
The financial markets are composed of credit markets, security markets and
foreign exchange markets. These three markets interact. In this article we re-
1email:ge@thp.uni-koeln.de
1
fer to foreign exchange markets. On foreign exchange markets currencies are
traded. Exchange rate changes are a measure for the economical efficiency of
national economics. The rate of exchange is the price for a foreign currency.
Increasing or decreasing prices of the currencies affect the development of
the particular national economy. So a devaluation causes expensive imports
and low priced exports.
1.2 The system of Bretton Woods
The foreign exchange market we know today existed not before the seventies
in this way. Fourty years ago, the system of Bretton Woods reigned over the
international financial world. In 1944 agents of 44 nations met in Bretton
Woods in the US-state New Hampshire under leadership of the victor nations
to decide about the economic future after the World War II. The members
of the conference brought about the World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund. The arrangement of Bretton Woods was enacted in December
1945. The purpose of this meeting was to reorganize and to stabilize world
commerce and international trade after the Second World War. The new
world currency system is based on the warranty of best possible free con-
vertibility of the currencies with fixed foreign exchange rates. The member
states had to trade their currencies either for parities in gold or parities to
the US Dollar, which showed a gold parity itself. So the US Dollar became
the new world’s leading currency [1].
1.3 Foreign exchange markets after Bretton Woods
The system of Bretton Woods was exempted at first from international finan-
cial crises. In Germany we know the time of economic growth as “economic
miracle”. The arrangement of Bretton Woods was only profitable for in-
dustrial nations. For developing countries the promised wealth was never
reached. Later, the weakening strength of the US Dollar compared to Euro-
pean currencies lead to speculative crises.
Thus since 1971 the arrangement was abolished step by step. For reduc-
tion of the great nonequilibrium in the balances of payments between the
EG currencies and the US currency, free rates of exchange were introduced
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in 1973. The fixed foreign exchange rates were replaced by free fluctuating
foreign exchange rates between the leading currencies which are today US
Dollar, Euro and Yen. The rate of exchange system was regulated by the
free game of the market forces, e.g.the private finance companies. The gov-
ernment did not interfere in foreign exchange market regularly. The prices
for different currencies result from the difference between demand and sup-
ply. Important for the rate of exchange is the faith of the investor in the
currency. Since controls for the turnover of capitals no longer exist and com-
puters render it possible to do transactions very quickly, rates of exchanges
are determined by short-term financing. Consequently, the foreign exchange
markets are not a true measure for the economical efficiency of the nations
[2].
1.4 Where does the trade with foreign exchanges take
place ?
62% of the world wide trading volume with foreign exchange in 1995 was
realized from only a few finance companies in the top five markets : United
Kingdom, United States, Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong. 85% of this
trade takes place in the top nine (top five plus Switzerland, Germany, France
and Australia) alone [2,4].
1.5 Crises
Unfortunately the less established financial markets today are determined
by proneness to crises (financial crises in the nineties and later: 1994 Mex-
ico, 1997 East Asia, 1998 Russia, 1999 Brazil [4] and 2001/2002 Argentina.).
Short-term transactions are in a high measure responsible for the fluctuations
of the rates of exchanges. Volatility favours the development of speculative
bubbles and in this way it could give rise to crises. This is especially diffi-
cult for developing countries because they react very sensitively on external
crises.
A model of financial crises is a four step one by Kindleberger[2]:
First stage:
An external occurence promises opportunities for making profit. The price
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for the hopefully profitable thing increases.
Second stage:
This attracts other investors, who want to profit from the increasing prices.
The increasing demand causes an increase of the price. The higher the expec-
tation of profit the more money will be invested. If the investors believe in
very high profit they raise a loan to invest more in the speculative operation.
Third stage:
The investors come to know that the profit expectation can not be fulfilled.
So the profit expectations turn back. The prices increase only slowly or they
remain stable.
Last stage:
The prices stagnate and the investors who financed the speculative operation
by credits can’t pay back the credits. They have to give up all or parts of
the securities. The prices of the speculative object decrease. The decreas-
ing prices cause investors to sell their papers panickingly. The worth of the
speculative object goes down. So profit expectation turns into losing busi-
ness and credits can’t be payed back. Papers which are used as securities for
further credits lose on worth and the banking establishment calls for further
securities, repay or they call in the credits. A bank crisis is possible. The
credit crisis turns to an insolvency of the inland economy. So the firms are
no longer solvent. The financial crisis is now in production sector, and this
causes unemployment with its consequences.
World wide, the ILO, in its 1998 World Employment Report, estimated that
unemployment increased by 10 million people solely due to the Asian financial
crises [3]. Often such crises spread out internationally. Above all short-term
capital played an important role in the finance crises of the nineties. Their
part on all trades increased about by 300 percent between 1990 and 1995.
An important reason for this growth is the removal of controls over turnover
of capitals. By means of such controls long-term credits or capital invest-
ments could be preferred over short-term investions. Additionally, interests
for short-term credits are more favourable than those for long-term credits,
because the risk for creditors is greater with long-term credits for developing
countries.
4
1.6 How does currency speculation work ?
If an investor expects the devaluation of a currency A, he will raise a credit in
this currency A. The money he gets in this way will be invested in a currency
B. When the devaluation of currency A occurs, the investor only has to take
a smaller part of his money in currency B to pay back the credit in currency
A. The rest of the money in currency B is his profit.
1.7 Herd behaviour
Through hedge funds and other financial organisations which operate in-
ternationally the speculation on currencies gets more weight. When a big
financial organisation invests a lot of money or calls a lot of money back
from a certain transaction, profit or loss expectation from other investors
rises. Thus a herd behaviour springs up. A lot of investors will try to get
a part of the quickly earned money. Much money will be invested in spec-
ulative operations. Sometimes the foreign exchange reserve of the central
bank will be spent, if the central bank tries to stabilize the own currency by
means of buying. If this method fails, the currency speculation is followed
by a devaluation of the currency.
1.8 Trading volume on foreign exchange markets
When in 1971 the USA abandoned the Bretton Woods system of fixed foreign
exchange rates and the first transactions with computers came into being,
the turnover on the financial markets grew in an abnormal way. From 1970 to
2000 the turnover of the trade with currencies increased from 70 billion to 1.5
trillion US Dollars each trading day. Especially 80% of the 1.5 trillion Dollars
are short-term transactions with terms less than seven days, and more than
40% involve round-trips (a purchase operation followed by a resale operation)
within two days or less [3]. To estimate the dimensions of speculation we
have to take into consideration that annual turnover by 200 trading days in
a year reaches 300 trillion US Dollar and this is 40 times the international
product and service trade. And 90% of the turnover are speculative short-
term transactions and only 10% goes into the production sector [5].
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1.9 The Tobin tax
To slow down this process in order that less operations will be speculative
and the rates of exchange less fluctuating, James Tobin2 already suggested
in 1972 to impose a tax with a tax rate of 1% affecting all buying and sell-
ing currency transactions3. Today a tax rate between 0.05% and 0.5% is
discussed. The tax Tobin recommended should affect the speculators. The
investors try to use smallest price differences even below the 10−3 border
by foreign rates of exchange. This transactions don’t have a real economic
meaning. The development of the exchange rates reflect only the hopes of
the investors. Supporters of the tax believe that a small tax will make such
transactions unprofitable. The rate and the number of such short-term trans-
actions slow down without affecting long-term credits and long-term capital
investment. More precisely, they talk about a filter function of the Tobin tax:
The tax renders all currency transactions ( no matter whether short-term or
long-term) more expensive. But because of the different terms the conse-
quences for the different dealing are very different. Short-term transactions
are only lucrative when the expectation of the profit is higher than Tobin
tax. For example: if Tobin tax rate is 0.5% and one wants to do a transac-
tion for only one week: in this case an annual interest of 52% is necessary
to make the transaction profitable. The reduction of short-term transactions
will favour long-term transactions. Speculation is reduced and this is hoped
to be a prevention for crises. But there is still a fact where Tobin tax is
not a method to control. Even the supporters of Tobin tax says that this
kind of tax can’t minimize speculation operations where 10% to 50% profit
is promised. Therefore other controls about turnover of capital should be
used. Supporters of the tax named two reasons for introducing Tobin tax:
on the one hand the tax would regulate the speculative operations, on the
other hand there will be a source of income which is estimated in a two figure
billion US Dollars range. Estimates from Felix and Sau in 1996 tell that a
2James Tobin was an American economist. Since 1955 he taught at Yale University.
In 1981 Tobin became the Nobel Laureate for his papers about monetary theory for gov-
ernmental financial management [5].
3Tobin’s proposed tax on international currency transactions, intended to curb spec-
ulation, is an extension to foreign exchange markets of Keynes’s proposed tax on stock
market transactions. Keynes advocated a tax to curb speculation in stock markets. He ad-
vocated stronger measures for foreign exchange markets, such as capital controls to defend
the autonomy of national stabilization policies. These capital controls were an essential
factor to Keynes’s wartime proposal for an International Clearing Union [4].
6
tax rate of 0.25% will reduce the transaction volume less than 33% [5]. With
these reasons for Tobin Tax in mind, many people in government or from
other organisations like WEED or ATTAC4 agree to the tax.
2 The model of Cont and Bouchaud [6,7]
We get our results due to combining Tobin tax in two different ways with
the microscopic model of Cont and Bouchaud based on percolation theory.
In percolation theory we start to fill the lattice in the way that each site is
randomly occupied with probability p and empty with probability (1 − p).
Neighboring occupied sites form clusters. If a contiguous path of occupied
sites connects upper and bottom of the lattice for the first time, the threshold
value p = p
c
is reached.
In the model presented, the randomly formed clusters are agents who act
together, to describe herding behaviour in financial markets. Different clus-
ters reach their decision about buying or selling absolutely randomly and
indepently from the other clusters. If there is more supply than demand, the
price change decreases proportionally to the difference - otherwise the price
change increases. In every iteration, each cluster makes a decision to buy or
to sell, each with probability a (which is called the activity). The cluster is
inactive in the iteration with probability (1 − 2a). The maximum value of
the activity is 0.5 . We can interpret the activity as a measure for length
of the time which we handle in one iteration. If we take the value a close
to 0.5, we handle big time steps where nearly all clusters have already made
a decision to buy or to sell. Otherwise a small a means that one iteration
represents not enough time so that there are only a few clusters who make
in this iteration a decision to buy or to sell.
The probability distribution of the price fluctuations shows many smaller and
less big fluctuations and the graph is essentially symmetrical. For an activity
a close to 0.5 the results at the critical point p
c
are similar to a Gaussian
curve. For a smaller activity (in particular if we take an a corresponding to
intra day time scales) we get heavy tails in the distribution of stock price
4On initiative of the french monthly “ Le Monde diplomatique´” come out in june 1998
ATTAC “Association pour une taxation financieres pour l’aide aux citoyens”. ATTAC is
now represented in 30 countries. A purpose from ATTAC is that policy regulates financial
markets and not reverse.
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variations in the form of a power law truncated by size effects. Such a be-
haviour was observed in empirical studies of high frequency market data.
Furthermore there exists weak correlations between successive price changes,
and strong correlations (“volatility clustering”) between successive absolute
values of price changes.
The framework of the simulation
• We determine with the complicated algorithm of Hoshen and Kopelman
the number n
s
of clusters with s agents. Note that if one works with p
greater than p
c
, one has to ignore the one infinite cluster. This infinite
cluster causes only crashes and bubbles.
• We decide randomly if the cluster is active in this iteration.
– If the cluster is active, we decide by another random number if
the cluster would like to buy or to sell an amount which cor-
responds to the size of the cluster. The return, the difference∑
s
(n+
s
∗ s− n−
s
∗ s) which means especially the difference between
demand and supply, is proportional to price change in this time
step.
– If the cluster is not active, it contributes nothing to the return.
• If we have all clusters processed in this way, one iteration is finished
and we start again from beginning.
The best agreement with real price fluctuations is found when the concen-
tration is slightly above p
c
. One gets the biggest fluctuations when p is equal
to p
c
. Cont and Bouchaud identified p = p
c
therefore with market crashes.
There are already different modifications of this model in existence [8].
3 Modifications of the model of Cont and
Bouchaud by introducing Tobin tax
In the original Cont-Bouchaud model we have only two parameters: the ac-
tivity a and the concentration p (the probability to find an occupied site in
the lattice. In our simulations we work always at the critical point p
c
). The
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modified versions of the model used here, has three additional parameters:
Tobin tax, Producers and maxwin.
Producers are people who act, even when they not expect to make profit,
e.g. to pay a bill.
Because the returns of the Cont-Bouchaud model are often large integers and
the Tobin tax is a very small number (less than 1%), we have to normalize the
returns. We take two values for maxwin here: 50% and 5%. In the first case,
this means that if all clusters in an iteration are active and buying, the return
is +50%. Otherwise, if all clusters are active and selling only, the return is
-50%. Certainly, not all clusters will buy in the same iteration and not all
clusters will sell in the same iteration. We actually get returns between -8%
and +8% with the original Cont-Bouchaud model in the case of maxwin=
50%. For the case of maxwin= 5% we get actual returns between -0.8% and
+0.8% (see figures 8a, 8b and 9). Note that 80% of the daily speculation
trade has taken place because the traders would like to take advantage of
profits below the 10−3 border. Thus the value maxwin= 5% is rational.
3.1 First modification of the Cont-Bouchaud model
The framework of the simulation
• Because our agents believe that the return of the time step before,
which we call r
−
, is authoritative for the following return development,
we need r
−
in this model. In the first time step we took r
−
= 1%.
• We determine the number n
s
of clusters with s agents with the algo-
rithm of Hoshen and Kopelman.
• We decide randomly if the cluster is active in this iteration.
– If the cluster is active we have to test, whether the condition (r
−
greater than Tobin tax) has been fulfilled or not.
∗ If this is the case we decide by another random number, if the
cluster would like to buy or to sell an amount which corre-
sponds to the size of the cluster.
Notice: Both, for buying and selling, we take the condition r
−
greater than Tobin tax. In the first case we simulate optimists
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(these are people who buy because r
−
is greater than Tobin
tax and they believe that r
−
of next time step will exceed
current one) and in the second pessimists (these people sell
because r
−
is greater than Tobin tax and they believe that r
−
in the next time step will be in the same order of magnitude
as in the current time step but it will change the sign).
The return, the difference
∑
s
(n+
s
s− n−
s
s) which means the
difference between demand and supply, is proportional to the
price change in this time step.
∗ If the condition is not true we decide through another random
number if the cluster is forced to trade because it belongs to
the Producers.
· If the cluster is a Producer we decide randomly if the clus-
ter buys or sells and take it into account for the calculation
of the return.
· If the cluster does not trade it contributes nothing to re-
turn or turnover.
– If the cluster is not active it contributes nothing to return or
turnover.
• At the end of the iteration we save the return to use it in the next
iteration as new r
−
. We normalize the returns as described above.
• If we have handled all the clusters in this way, we have finished one
time step and we begin the next by redistributing anew the occupied
sites.
Note that when there are no Producers and the condition is never fulfilled
the return is always zero.
3.2 Second modification of the Cont-Bouchaud model
The framework of the simulation
• We took again r
−
= 1% initially.
• We determine the number n
s
of clusters with s agents.
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• We decide randomly if the cluster is active in this iteration.
– If the cluster is active we have to test, whether one of the condi-
tions (r
−
greater equal than Tobin tax or r
−
less than (− Tobin
tax)) has been fulfilled or not.
∗ If this is the case we decide by another random number, if
the cluster would like to buy or to sell an amount which cor-
responds to the size of the cluster. The cluster trades in the
following two cases: 1. r
−
greater than Tobin tax and the
cluster will buy (this simulates the behaviour of optimists be-
cause they believe that the return will further increase). 2.
r
−
less than (− Tobin tax) and the cluster will sell (this sim-
ulates the behaviour of pessimists because they believe that
the return will further decrease). As above, we determine the
return by the difference between demand and supply.
• Now for Producers etc. we procede as in the first modification.
We examine the second modification only for RM.
4 Results
To get figures 1-6,11-13 and 16, we took for our calculations an average over
about 10000 cluster configurations and a square lattice of length 31. The
activity was a=0.4999.
For many of our results we calculate the turnover and sum it up over 500
time steps. With this turnover we determine the profit for government as
a function of Tobin tax by multiplication of the turnover with the Tobin
tax rate. To get better results we multiply profit for government by 108,
which corresponds to a summation of turnover about more iterations. The
model without Tobin tax can be related to Tobin tax equal zero (which we
call “rational model” (RM)) or alternatively to the original Cont-Bouchaud
model, where all investors trade even for negative r
−
(which we call “similar
Cont-Bouchaud model (SCBM)). When we examine y as a function of Tobin
tax, the differentiation between these two models leads to an other scale of
the y axis. To see this, we show the comparison between these two models
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in figures 3 - 6 for the first modification of the Cont-Bouchaud model. We
examine the second modification only for RM.
To get the turnover as a function of Tobin tax, we set the turnover we
get the way described above for zero Tobin tax to 100%. Then we relate the
turnover we get for a positive Tobin tax to the one when we set the Tobin
tax to zero.
(Alternatively, we could normalize here again the turnover to that of the
original Cont-Bouchaud model.)
4.1 Results of the first modification of the Cont-Bouchaud
model
• Turnover as a function of time
In fig.1a we see that trade will go to zero when there are no Producers.
We also see the way the trade volume will decrease with increasing
Tobin tax when there are 0.5% Producers. We took maxwin= 5%
The graph shows from top to bottom:
The first line shows the turnover we get with the original Cont-Bouchaud
model. The next line is a turnover when people only trade, if r
−
is
greater or equal zero.
We get the following three by introducing 0.5% Producers with a To-
bin tax of zero (empty circles), 0.16% (full circles) and 0.5% (triangles).
The next three lines show the development of turnover when nobody
has to act, i.e. when there are no Producers, for the same three tax
levels.
What we see if there are no Producers, the turnover approaches zero
the faster, the higher Tobin tax is.
• Profit for government
Fig.1b shows the government profit as a function of the Tobin tax for
the RM. We took again maxwin= 5%.
From top to bottom the graph shows the behaviour when we take the
following values for the Producers: 0.5 % , 0.4 % , 0.3 % , 0.2 % and
12
Figure 1: a) Turnover as a function of time. b) Government profit as a
function of Tobin tax. From top to bottom: 0.5% , 0.4%, 0.3%, 0.2% and
0.1% Producers.
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finally 0.1 %.
In fig.2a we take 1% Producers and fit the first part by the straight line
y = (3983± 630)+ (126550± 14585) ∗ x (where x represents the Tobin
tax rate and y the profit for government)
and the last part by the straight line
y = (17762± 163) + (10622± 356) ∗ x.
Both straight lines intersect at (0.120%± 0.009%) Tobin tax.
Thus if a Tobin tax should be introduced by government, we suggest a
value of ≈ 0.12%. This is the case where government makes the high-
est profit from speculators, on condition of returns between ≈ −0.8%
and ≈ +0.8% (fig.8b). These returns are reasonable because we have
seen above, speculators try to take advantage of profits below the 10−3
border. If we take one time step as a week, the extreme return of 0.8%
corresponds to an interest calculation of 83.2% per annum. Further-
more we found in our calculations that the value of ≈ 0.12% Tobin
tax is independent of the number of Producers as long as there are
not more than 5% Producers. Notice that in reality there are far less
Producers than 5%, so we can propose a tax of ≈ 0.12%.
The straight line with which we fitted the first part of the graph cor-
responds to ignoring the Tobin tax, in the way that is not dependent
on the Producers. The second straight line fitted the part where only
the Producers trade.
• Turnover as a function of Tobin tax
In fig.2b we take 1% Producers and maxwin= 5%. We show the way
the turnover will decrease if we introduce a Tobin tax. If we take the
proposed value of 0.12%, the turnover decreases by about 87%.
• Profit for government as a function of Tobin tax.
We will compare RM and SCBM.
– At first we take maxwin= 5%
14
Figure 2: In this figure we take 1% Producers. a) Profit for government as a
function of Tobin tax. b) Turnover as a function of Tobin tax.
15
Figure 3: Profit for government as a function of Tobin tax, we take from
upper to bottom 0.005%, 0.004%, 0.0035%, 0.003% Producers. a) RM. b)
SCBM.
From top to bottom fig.3a (RM) and fig.3b (SCBM) show the
curves for 0.005%, 0.004%, 0.0035% and finally 0.003% Producers.
The fig.4a (RM) and fig.4b (SCBM) show that there won’t be a
difference between the values one should propose for Tobin tax,
when we compare both models. We take 0.005% Producers here.
The first part of figure 4a is fitted by
y = (28± 1) + (425± 17) ∗ x
The second straight line which is used to fit the second part is:
y = (71± 2) + (50± 4)*x
The first part of figure 4b is fitted by
y = (19± 1) + (281± 11) ∗ x
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Figure 4: Profit for government as a function of Tobin tax, we take 0.005%
Producers and maxwin= 5%. a) RM. b) SCBM.
The second straight line which is used to fit the second part is:
y = (46± 1) + (35± 3) ∗ x
Again we can state that the convenient Tobin tax is (0.113% ±
0.013%) (which corresponds to the value we got above within the
error margin) when we relate to zero (RM).
And when we take the model similar to Cont-Bouchaud (SCBM),
we get for government a convenient Tobin tax of (0.118%±0.008%).
– Now we take maxwin=50%
The returns one gets now are actually between −8% and +8%.
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Figure 5: Profit for government as a function of Tobin tax, we take 0.005%,
0.004%, 0.0035% and 0.003% Producers and maxwin= 50%. a) RM. b)
SCBM.
From top to bottom in fig.5a and fig.5b are curves for 0.005%,
0.004%, 0.0035% and finally 0.003% Producers.
We see in fig.5a and fig.5b that there is an expected difference for
proposing a Tobin tax depending on the value of maxwin.
The first part of fig.6a is fitted by
y = (0± 0) + (2301± 0) ∗ x
The second straight line which is used to fit the second part is:
y = (303± 3) + (385± 7)*x
Both straight lines intersect at (0.158± 0.002)% Tobin tax.
The first part of fig. 6b is fitted by
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Figure 6: Profit for government as a function of Tobin tax, we take 0.005%
Producers and maxwin=50%. a) RM. b) SCBM.
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Figure 7: Profit for government as a function of Tobin tax with increasing
Producers,maxwin=5%
y = (0.55± 0.69) + (1519± 10) ∗ x
The second straight line which is used to fit the second part is:
y = (204± 2) + (253± 5) ∗ x
Here both straight lines intersect at (0.161± 0.004)% Tobin tax.
Both values we get here for Tobin tax agree within the margin
errors.
Result here: If we take maxwin as 50% we should propose a Tobin
tax of 0.16%.
• Profit for government as a function of Tobin tax with increasing Pro-
ducers.
Here in fig.7 we have from top to bottom 100%, 90%, 80%, 70%, 60%,
50%, 40%, 30%, 20%, 10%, 5% and finally 1%. One can see that we
get straight lines as long as there are 50% Producers . These straight
lines show that there is an insensitivity against the Tobin tax.
But in real currency markets there are not so many Producers. The
number of Producers will converge to a very small number. But it does
not converge to zero because there are people who must sell because
they need money.
We get the following straight lines from top to bottom:
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Straight lines which fit profit as a function of Tobin tax
Producers Straight line
100% ⇔ Cont-Bouchaud y = 0
90% y = (987570± 607) ∗ x− (1168± 212)
80% y = (971500± 1335) ∗ x− (2615± 466)
70% y = (952320± 2297) ∗ x− (4493± 802)
60% y = (924940± 3561) ∗ x− (6987± 1243)
50% y = (888740± 5244) ∗ x− (10369± 1832)
70% y = (833460± 7571) ∗ x− (15207± 2644)
• Return as a function of time
In the following Figs.8 and 9 the “+” sign represents the returns in
the original Cont-Bouchaud model, the “x” sign represents the returns
when r
−
should be greater or equal to zero, “ * ” shows the behaviour
when a Tobin tax of 0.01% is introduced and the empty squares stand
for returns when a tax of 0.16% is introduced.
We took a square lattice of length 31 and an average about 100 cluster
configurations.
In fig.8a (maxwin= 50%) and fig.8b (maxwin= 5%) we took 1% Pro-
ducers. In fig.9 we took only 0.005% Producers (maxwin= 5%).
• The Return Histogram
The deviation of the heavy tails from the Gaussian will be characterized
by a significant excess kurtosis which is defined by
κ =
µ4
σ4
− 3 , (1)
where µ4 is the fourth central moment and σ the standard deviation of
the returns. κ should be zero for a normal distribution but it ranges
between 2 and 50 for daily returns and is even higher for intra day data.
The fat tails correspond to large fluctuations in returns.
For the following calculations we took a square lattice of length 101. We
took an average of about 100 cluster configurations and made 100000
iterations.
Here are the prices not normalized and we take 1% Producers.
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Figure 8: Return as a function of time, 1% Producers. a) maxwin=50%, b)
maxwin=5%
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Figure 9: Return as a function of time, maxwin=5%, Producers= 0.005%
Figure 17 shows from outside to inside the Gaussian for the original
Cont-Bouchaud model for which we get a kurtosis of κ = 0.58 here
(probably this is due to the small lattice). The next interior curve
represents the case when people act when r
−
is greater or equal zero
(κ = 3.71). What follows is the curve where Tobin tax amounts 0.01%
(κ = 8.38) and for the last one a Tobin tax of 0.16% (κ = 56.76) is
assumed. In figure 16 we have add the following two cases: The Cont-
Bouchaud model with activity a=10% and a=1%. The outer one of the
two added curves corresponds to activity a=10% (κ = 4.96) and the
other one to a=1% (κ = 54.72).
From the picture we get the results that the effect of “convergence” to
zero is the greater the greater Tobin tax is and the “convergence” to
zero is for a → 1% not so drastic as for Tobin tax → 0.16%.
• Number of speculating and trading investors
For Fig.11, we sum up the number of investors who are former spec-
ulators (+) or still active speculators (x) over about 500 time steps
for different values of Tobin tax rate. We define former speculators in
the following way: The former speculators are those people who don’t
trade because they do not fulfill the condition r
−
greater than Tobin
tax. Here is maxwin= 5% and Producers= 1%. Fig.11 shows the re-
sult for the RM. We have seen above that a Tobin tax rate of 0.12%
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Figure 10: a)Histogram of returns. b) Histogram of returns compared with
different activities.
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Figure 11: RM. a) Number of former speculators (+) and still active spec-
ulators (x). b) Number of clusters (former speculators (+) and still active
speculators (x). c) Former speculators (+) and still active speculators (x)
(percentage).
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is convenient for government. But you can see that we have here 91%
former speculators and only 9% still active speculators.
The SCBM gives nearly the same result except the fact that when To-
bin tax is equal zero there are no former speculators and all available
investors are active speculators.
The sum about number of clusters corresponding to the sum about the
number of investors lies between 18265 and 18275.
If we take a look on the number of investors who are former or active
speculators as a function of time, we get straight lines.
Straight lines which fit the number of former speculators as a function of time
Condition to trade Straight line
Cont-Bouchaud y = 0
r
−
≥ 0% y = (83.833± 0.002) ∗ x− (66.062± 0.466)
r
−
≥ 0.01% y = (175.362± 0.003) ∗ x− (268.98± 0.870)
r
−
≥ 0.16% y = (208.527± 0.005) ∗ x− (379.22± 1.587)
Straight lines which fit the number of still active speculators as a function of time
Condition to trade Straight line
Cont-Bouchaud y = (229.642± 0.001) + (3.305± 0.429)
r
−
≥ 0% y = (145.774± 0.003) ∗ x+ (68.755± 0.764)
r
−
≥ 0.01% y = (54.265± 0.003) ∗ x+ (266.055± 0.777)
r
−
≥ 0.16% y = (21.029± 0.003) ∗ x− (359.080± 0.926)
For every value of Tobin tax we have an average cluster size of (6.42±
0.02) and the “infinite” cluster we ignored because it causes only crashes
and bubbles has an average size of (311.38± 0.97) .
4.2 Results of the second modification of the Cont-
Bouchaud model
With this modification we did in generally the same calculations as described
above but only for RM.
• Turnover as a function of time
In fig.12a we see that trade will go to zero when there are no Produc-
ers. We also see the way the trade volume will decrease with increasing
Tobin tax when there are 0.5% Producers. We took maxwin= 5%
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The graph shows from top to bottom:
The first line shows the turnover we get with 0% Tobin tax and 0.5%
Producers. The next line is a turnover with 0% Tobin tax and 0%
Producers.
We get the next following two lines which does not present a decrease
of turnover after by about 100 time steps with 0.5% and 1% Tobin
tax and in both cases 0.5% Producers. The next two lines describe
the behaviour for 0% Producers for 0.5% Tobin tax and 1% Tobin tax.
What we see if there are no Producers, the turnover approaches zero
the faster, the higher Tobin tax is, but the decay is not so drastic as
we have seen with the first modification of the Cont-Bouchaud model.
• Profit for government
Fig.12b shows the profit for government as a function of the Tobin tax.
From top to bottom the graph shows the behaviour when we take the
following values for the Producers: 15%, 11%, 10%, 8%, 7%, 6%, 5%,
4%, 3%, 2%, 1%, 0.1% and finally 0%.
We see here that the maximum goes to higher Tobin tax rates for an
increasing number of Producers. We took here maxwin= 5%. When
we took maxwin= 50% the maximum of profit for government is above
1.5% Tobin tax.
• Tobin tax to get maximal profit
Fig.13a shows the Tobin tax value one should take to get maximal
income for government (Ttp) as a function of the Producers (P). The
curve (+) is especially well fitted between 0% and 2% Producers (this
corresponds to reality values for Producers) by
T tp =
√
P
25
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10
.
• Turnover as a function of Tobin tax
In fig.13b we take 1% Producers and maxwin= 5%. We show the way
the turnover will decrease if we introduce a Tobin Tax. The “+” sign
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Figure 12: a) Turnover as a function of time. b) Profit for government as
a function of Tobin tax. From top to bottom: 15%, 11%, 10%, 8%, 7%, 6%,
5%, 4%, 3%, 2%, 1%, 0.1% and finally 0% Producers.
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Figure 13: a) Tobin tax to get maximal profit as a function of Producers.
b) Turnover as a function of Tobin tax with 1% Producers.
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Figure 14: The return as a function of time.
is the turnover we get by buying and selling, “x” presents just the
turnover by buying and “*” shows the turnover we get only by selling.
To get the maximal profit we have to take a Tobin tax of 0.48% under
condition of 1% Producers (we call this value T
max
. T
max
is Ttp for one
percent Producers). We see here that we have there still a turnover of
73%.
• Return as a function of time
We calculate the return as a function of time as described in the first
modification of the Cont-Bouchaud model. We take 1% Producers and
5% maxwin. The first line of fig.14 shows the behaviour for 0% Tobin
tax, the next line for 1% Tobin tax and the line which fluctuate about
zero (even for t equal 1) is for 0.48% Tobin tax. We see here and with
the following tabular that the prices will less fluctuate at the value
of Tobin tax where government profit has a maximum. We got the
following tabular by maxwin= 5%. Tt means “Tobin tax”, STFZ is
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the first time step where the return starts to fluctuate about zero, sd
means “standard deviation” and we find in the last column the value
of r
−
at t=1 which we call r
−
1.
Tt actual returns STFZ average sd r
−
1
0 (−0.04%)-0.12% 1000 −4.1E(−2) 2.6E(−2) 2.49%
0.01 (−0.1%)-0.08% 1000 −1.7E(−3) 2.7E(−2) 2.49%
0.16 (−0.09%)-0.09% 1000 1.4E(−3) 2.7E(−2) 2.49%
0.2 (−0.09%)-0.11% 1000 −7.9E(−3) 2.9E(−2) 2.49%
0.4 (−0.09%)-0.11% 1000 −4.7E(−3) 2.4E(−2) 2.46%
0.48 (−0.007%)-0.007% 0 −1.7E(−4) 1.9E(−3) 0.001%
0.5 (−0.007%)-0.007% 0 −1.7E(−4) 1.9E(−3) 0.001%
1.0 (−0.03%)-0.03% 70 −2.7E(−4) 9.2E(−3) 2.49%
The returns as a function of time have a minimum of fluctuations for
T = T
max
. This shows that one get both, on the one hand maximal gov-
ernment profit and on the other hand a minimum of return fluctuations
which is important to be able to reduce speculation.
The following tabular we get for maxwin= 50%. Remember that in
this case the maximum of government profit is above 1.5% Tobin tax.
Tt actual returns STFZ average sd r
−
1
0 (−0.3%)-1.2% 1000 4.1E(−1) 2.6E(−1) 24.9%
0.5 (−0.8%)-0.8% 1000 −4.3E(−2) 2.4E(−1) 24.9%
You see that here the return fluctuations are much higher than for
maxwin =5%.
• The Return Histogram
Fig.15a: shows from outside to inside the behaviour for 0% Tobin tax
and 0.5% Tobin tax for an activity of a= 1%. Fig.15b shows the price
histogram for an activity of 50% and a Tobin tax of 1.8%. Unfortu-
nately we have not a realistic price histogram for an activity of 50%
and a Tobin tax below 1.8%.
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Figure 15: a) Histogram of returns with a=1%.
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Kurtosis
activity Tobin tax Kurtosis
50% 1.8 160
50% 2 170
50% 10 109
1% 0 103
1% 0.5 5130
1% 1 5271
1% 10 5604
• Number of former speculating and still active speculating investors
For Fig.16, we sum up the number of investors who are former specula-
tors (+) or still active speculators (x) about 500 time steps for different
values of Tobin tax rate. We define former speculators in the following
way: The former speculators are those people who don’t trade because
they do not fulfill one of the conditions r
−
greater than Tobin tax or
r
−
less than (− Tobin tax). Here is maxwin= 5% and Producers= 1%.
The curves intersect at 0.53% Tobin tax. At T
max
(0.48% Tobin tax)
we have here 42% former speculators and 58% still active speculators.
Summary
In conclusion, the first modification of the Cont-Bouchaud model towards an
introduction of a Tobin tax does not lead to the desired maximum value for
profit as a function of Tobin tax rate. Instead, it discourages most specula-
tors (96%) if it becomes of the order of 0.5%.
The differentiation between these two models (RM and SCBM) does not
lead to different values one should propose for a Tobin tax rate. But when
we multiply the returns of Cont-Bouchaud model by 10, the Tobin tax rate
needs to be multiplied by 1.33.
Results about Tobin tax which one should propose
maxwin return tax rate (RM) tax rate (SCBM)
5% ±0.8% 0.12% 0.12%
50% ±8% 0.16% 0.16%
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Figure 16: a) Number of former speculators (+) and still active speculators
(x). b) Number of clusters (former speculators (+) and still active speculators
(x)). c) Number of former speculators or still active speculators (percentage).
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Kurtosis
activity Tobin tax or model Kurtosis
50% original Cont-Bouchaud model 0.58
10% original Cont-Bouchaud model 4.96
1% original Cont-Bouchaud model 54.72
50% r
−
≥ 0% 3.71
50% r
−
≥ 0.01% 8.38
50% r
−
≥ 0.16% 56.76
The second modification leads to a desired maximum for government profit,
sufficient turnover and damped return oscillations but not to a realistic return
histogram for maximal activity and a Tobin tax below 1.8%. On the other
hand it is a further success of this modification that when we work at T
max
we discourage 42% of the speculators.
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